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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of a remedial education program
- the Roma Teaching Assistant Program - targeting the socially ex-
cluded Roma minority in Serbia. By using first-hand collected data,
we find evidence that children exposed to the program went more to
school. We do not find an effect on dropouts or marks for all grades.
An examination of heterogeneous effects suggests that children in the
first grade benefited more from the program as compared to their
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older peers through lower dropouts and better marks. Overall, our
results suggest that well-targeted remedial education programs can
boost outcomes of low performers.
Keywords: primary education, remedial education, Roma, ethnic mi-
nority, absences, dropouts
JEL classification codes: I21, J15, D04
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1 Introduction
Roma are mainly located in South Eastern Europe and with a population of
approximately six million people they constitute the largest ethnic minority
in the continent (Open Society Institute, 2008).1 They experience severe
social exclusion in terms of high poverty levels (European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights, 2014), low educational attainments (Brueggemann,
2012)2 and no participation in the political and cultural life (Kocze, 2012).
Schooling is considered to be a remedy to alleviate poverty and improve
living conditions of disadvantaged ethnic or racial groups and to foster their
integration: higher enrollment rates and better achievement at school are
expected to lead to persistent effects in the labor market and in the reduction
of poverty in the long-run. The Roma Teaching Assistant (RTA) Program is
the main intervention targeting Roma inclusion in education in South Eastern
Europe. Roma assistants - one per each school - participate in regular lessons
where they provide additional help to Roma pupils who have difficulties in
following classes. They organize additional lessons, help them with their
homework and assignments and once per week visit their parents.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the RTA Program in
the first year of its introduction.3 We examine the causal effect of the RTA
Program by asking the following three questions. Does the program reduce
dropouts? Does the program raise attendance? Does the program improve
marks? To answer these questions, we use primary data collected during five
months in the Summer-Autumn 2010. We employ two different econometric
strategies and their combination. First, we exploit the gradual implementa-
tion and the intensity of the program in order to base the evaluation of its
impact on a comparison of Early and Late Enrollees. Second, we compare
children exposed to the program to older cohorts less exposed to it. There
is evidence that all children exposed to the program went on average more
to school. We also find evidence that marks improved in mathematics and
Serbian for first graders. Higher impacts are obtained in schools with a lower
number of Roma. This is especially the case for girls, for whom being in a
school with a lower number of Roma turns out to be more favorable. Boys
1The number of Roma and the subsequent numbers refer to the following countries:
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Roma-
nia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
2In 2011, the share of Roma aged 10 to 18 who have never attended school varies among
countries and it can reach percentages above 20. Primary school attendance rates are in
the range of 60% to 80% in most countries, with some countries going from 40% to 50%
(Brueggemann, 2012).
3The Serbian name of the program is Romski Asistenti - Pomoc´ u Nastavi.
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respond to the program with fewer absences in schools with fewer Roma.
Only a handful of studies focus on the issues related to the education of
Roma people. These studies investigate topics such as the effects of school
segregation and the importance of affirmative actions, the role of preschool,
and the Roma/Non Roma achievement gap. In many countries in Cen-
tral, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Roma pupils are often segregated
from Non Roma pupils and unjustifiably placed in schools for mentally dis-
abled children. The attendance of these so-called special schools has a neg-
ative effect on educational attainment and on later labor market outcomes
(O’Higgins and Brueggemann, 2014). Thus desegregation policies are nec-
essary and governments have committed to desegregating schools, but their
implementation has not been successful (Rostas and Kostka, 2014). Con-
versely, affirmative action policies are an important tool for increasing the
access to higher education for Roma (Garaz, 2014).4 The attendance of
preschool has been shown to help to reduce the gap in cognitive outcomes
for Roma children (World Bank, 2012).5 Moreover, two interesting studies
(Kertesi and Kezdi, 2011; Baucal, 2006) investigate the Roma/Non Roma
gap and find large differences in educational outcomes between Roma and
Non Roma. Both studies show that the achievement gap between the two
groups decreases when accounting for the lower socio-economical status of
Roma.6
The principal contribution of this paper is that it adds evidence on short-
term effects of remedial education targeting a stigmatized ethnic group. Rig-
orous evaluations of remedial education programs are rare. Policies targeting
low-performing students are generally difficult to evaluate because children
with learning difficulties are not randomly assigned to programs. A few stud-
ies are able to overcome the identification problem and they find support for
the effectiveness of remedial education in the short run (Lavy and Schlosser,
4Almost all the empirical literature on affirmative actions focuses on the United States
experience. There are some studies in developing countries, especially in India, where the
debate on affirmative action to address the issues of inclusion and equity has been in place
for a long time (Basant and Sen, 2014). In Europe less extensive investigation has been
carried on in this respect.
5Strictly speaking this study bases its conclusions on correlations and not on causal
inference.
6Kertesi and Kezdi (2011) report a gap of one standard deviation for reading and math-
ematics in the eight grade between Roma and Non Roma in Hungary. The gap disappears
in reading and decreases by 85% in mathematics when accounting for health, family back-
ground, and school and class fixed effects. In Serbia, using national assessments, Baucal
(2006) reports that in the third grade of primary school Roma children are already lacking
behind their Non Roma peers. The achievement gap decreases by 40% when the lower
socio-economical status of Roma is taken into account.
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2005; Jacob and Lefgren, 2004; Hanushek et al., 2002; Banerjee et al., 2007).
The RTA Program is different from a standard remedial education interven-
tion because it targets a marginalized group that is widespread believed to
be different and cannot be integrated. In this case it would not be enough to
offer “only” remedial education, because the program could be ineffective for
two reasons. First, an additional Non Roma teacher could have low expecta-
tions and could not put in effort. Baucal (2006) in fact shows that in Serbia
school teachers have lower expectations from Roma and that they dedicate
less time to them thus this mechanism could be especially important in our
context. Second, the children could not respond to the program because of
expected low returns to education. Jensen (2010) has demonstrated that ex-
pected returns do affect the schooling decision. Therefore, the way in which
the RTA Program affects both the demand and supply side of education is the
following. On the one hand, children are provided with more teaching time.
The intervention alters the inputs in the education production function by
providing more instruction time to pupils through teaching assistants. Ad-
ditionally, negative stereotypes about Roma students could be softened and
teachers themselves could be providing more support in learning. This is
part of the supply side of education. On the other hand, Roma teaching
assistant has the same background as the targeted children and she acts as
a role model for them. The role model mechanism can affect preferences for
education of both children and parents and is expected to affect the demand
for education of the Roma population.7
This study also speaks to the literature on programs aiming at improv-
ing schooling outcomes of minority communities and the poor. The United
States has a long tradition of work on evaluations of school programs target-
ing disadvantaged groups. A wide range of programs across different stages
of the life cycle have been evaluated. Some of the well-known primary school
interventions include after-school programs (Lauer et al., 2006), merit pay
for principals, teachers, and students (Podgursky and Springer, 2007; Fryer,
2010), professional development for teachers (Boyd et al., 2009), getting par-
ents to be more involved (Domina, 2005), placing disadvantaged students
in better schools through desegregation busing (Angrist and Lang, 2004) or
altering the neighborhoods in which they live (Jacob, 2004; Sanbonmatsu
et al., 2006). The evidence on the efficacy of these interventions is mixed:
certain programs have left the achievement gap essentially unchanged while
7Recent literature emphasizes the importance of affecting the demand for education.
A prominent type of demand side programs are conditional cash transfers which raised
enrollment and attendance in many developing countries (Schultz, 2004). The provision
of financial incentives is an alternative intervention operating on the demand side (Fryer,
2011).
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others were more successful. This literature thus underscores the importance
of rigorous evaluations in order to use the available financial resources in the
most efficient way.
An additional contribution of this paper is that we give an accurate
overview of the attainments of Roma pupils, for which so far the data was
limited, and contrast their achievement to the average Non Roma pupils.
Our study is able to examine a wide range of outcomes which have been not
examined jointly to this date (such as dropouts and absences) due to limited
availability of data. To get a better understanding of the effectiveness of
an intervention it is important to understand if and at which margin it is
working. Policies that promote school enrollment may not promote learning
(Schultz, 2004; Miguel and Kremer, 2004). We believe that the outcomes
we use together with marks give a complete overview of the current state of
educational achievements of Roma pupils.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the Ser-
bian context that we are studying. Section 3 summarizes the Roma Teaching
Assistant Program and describes our data. Sections 4 explains our empir-
ical strategy and presents our results. Section 5 discusses the findings and
concludes.
2 Country context
Data on Roma in Serbia are inaccurate and scarce. Surveys often lack in-
formation about ethnic identity of the respondents. More importantly, when
asked about their ethnicity, some Roma people do not declare themselves as
Roma. Most of them consider themselves both Roma and Serbian and the
question of nationality allows only one answer.
The official 2011 census counts 147,600 Roma, while estimates put for-
ward a number between 350,000 and 500,000 or approximately 5-7% of the
overall population (Stojanovic´ and Baucal, 2007). Most Roma live in seg-
regated settlements and have different demographic characteristics from the
rest of the population. According to the World Bank Living Standard Mea-
surement Survey (LSMS) 2003 - which provides a boosted sample of Roma
in Serbia - their households are more numerous than the average household,
they have more children and their population is younger. The percentage of
male Roma who declare to have worked over the last week is similar to the
national average (69%). Contrary to men, the participation of women is 34%
and considerably lower than the national average (53%). Overall, approxi-
mately 60% of Roma have a consumption below the poverty line and weekly
consumption of food per household member is half the national average.
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Turning to education, 60% of Roma younger than 18 years old have not
completed primary education. In contrast, only 20% of overall population do
not have a primary school diploma. Out of all children of primary school-age,
30% of Roma do not attend school whereas this is the case for only 1% of
the overall population of primary school-age. Using data from the National
Assessment Study conducted with third grade students, Baucal (2006) finds
that after the first three years of school Roma pupils lag 2.2 - 2.5 years behind
the average student. Also, children from Roma ethnic minority performed
worse on standardized tests than Non Roma children with the same socio-
economic background.
The main barriers of access to education for Roma are absence of docu-
ments, financial constraints, parents’ low educational background, child la-
bor, discrimination from teachers and pupils and language barriers (Open
Society Institute, 2008). In the recent years Serbian schools started enrolling
children with incomplete documents, but there is still a minor number of
children not able to enroll due to lack of them. According to the law, the
local government should inform schools and parents that children who reach
the school-age in the municipality have to enroll at school. But Roma are
often not regularly registered as residents in the municipality and the local
government is not able to reach out to them. School books and additional
school material are a significant burden for the budget of poor families and
the most poor among Roma children do not even own adequate clothing for
winter months and live in overcrowded homes where they do not have ade-
quate conditions to pursue their studies. A majority of Roma parents has
low educational attainment and this implies that they often cannot help their
children with their school work. In addition, some parents attach little value
to schooling and education. These reasons together imply that the perceived
benefits of going to school are lower than respective costs. Moreover, in some
cases Roma children help their parents in their jobs. Also, Roma pupils can
face discrimination from teachers and other pupils. There is anecdotal evi-
dence that they are often seated in the last row in classrooms, that teachers
do not read their homework and that teachers do not encourage them in their
studies. Another problematic issue is that a considerable share of them is
sent to special schools.8 Finally, in a survey conducted by UNICEF - Multi-
ple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2006 - only 10% of Roma declare Serbian to be
their mother tongue. Children may face difficulties at school due to limited
knowledge of Serbian.9
8Special schools are schools for children with special educational needs.
9With few exceptions, the rest declare Romani to be their mother tongue.
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3 Roma Teaching Assistant Program and data
3.1 The Roma Teaching Assistant Program
The Roma Teaching Assistant Program started as a pilot program imple-
mented by various NGOs in 2002. In 2007 the OSCE took over its coordi-
nation and financing. In 2009 the program started to have a country wide
coverage and it is now under the coordination of the Ministry of Education.
In the scholastic year 2009/2010, 48 primary schools had a Roma assistant:
22 schools started with the program at different points of time between 2002
and 2007; 26 schools started in 2009. The Ministry expanded the program
to other 77 schools starting from November 2010.
Based on when the program started in a school, the schools can be di-
vided in two groups: schools entering the program in September 2009 (Early
Enrollees) and schools entering the program in November 2010 (Late En-
rollees). The 22 schools, which joined the program between 2002 and 2007,
are excluded from our analysis. The selection of these schools was not cen-
tralized: they were chosen by NGOs based on the share of Roma pupils. For
our analysis we will consider only 26 Early Enrollees and 77 Late Enrollees.
Both schools and potential Roma assistants had to apply to participate
in the program. Among 78 schools that applied in 2009, a commission rep-
resenting the government institutions together with OSCE representatives,
chose 26 Early Enrollee schools based on the percentage of Roma students
(between 5% and 40%) and preferably, the availability of a preschool program
in the school.10 The requirements for Roma assistants were knowledge of Ro-
mani, secondary school diploma and experience in working with children. 158
candidates applied for 26 assistant positions.11 In 2010 the program was re-
named to Education for all and starting with the scholastic year 2010/2011
Roma teaching assistants were renamed to pedagogical assistants. In year
2010, 252 schools applied for 77 assistants. Similar to the first round, schools
were eligible only if they had between 5% and 40% of Roma. The only dif-
ference between the two rounds was that in the second round the availability
1064 out of 78 schools that applied had a percentage of Roma between 5% and 40%.
Among these 64, OSCE selected 19 schools (out of 26) with a preschool program, five
schools (out of 36) with no preschool program and two schools (out of two) for which no
information is available.
11The following criteria were taken into account for the ranking of the assistants’ appli-
cations: highest level of education completed or enrolled (from 10 to 30 points), experience
in working with Roma children (0 to 10 points), experience in working on projects related
to education (0 to 10 points), motivation (0 to 10 points), attendance of relevant seminars
and/or courses (0 to 10 points), experience as Roma teaching assistant (0 to 10 points),
knowledge of Romani (0 to 10 points) and additional points (0 to 10 points).
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of a preschool program was not considered. The reason is that in 2010/2011
pedagogical assistants started to work in 50 kindergartens offering compul-
sory preschool program. Schools not offering the preschool program could
have then been close to kindergartens offering it. The Roma pupil would
have been helped by an assistant from her entry in the school anyhow. One
could argue that this small change in requirements could lead to a selection
bias in the two rounds, but our data do not support this claim.12 Selection
criteria for now pedagogical assistants remained unchanged and out of the
329 applications for the position, 77 were accepted to work at schools and
another 50 were accepted for kindergartens.
Schools got to know that they would receive an assistant in early June.
They did not inform parents about the presence of the RTAs. The program
did not receive publicity from TV and radio. This leads us to believe that
parents were not aware of the existence of the RTA before enrolling their
children at school. Data also confirm that Early Enrollees did not attract
more Roma students than Late Enrollees in the first year of the program.13
There is not selection of children into schools.
Every school received only one assistant. Schools received from the Min-
istry a description of her duties, but they were free to decide how to allocate
the time of the assistant depending on the needs of the school.14 Activities
at school involve both working during regular classes and after-school work.
Work with local communities comprises duties such as collecting information
about children who did not enroll or who left school, gathering documents
for school enrollment, visiting families,15 cooperation with Roma NGOs, etc.
The assistants were advised to work mainly with lower grades, especially the
first. Their objectives were to ensure that children go to school, to prevent
them from dropping out and to help them to succeed at school. In 2009
the Ministry of Education organized a series of seminars with the goal of
12Unfortunately we do not have information on the availability of a preschool program
for schools applying in 2010/2011. Nonetheless, it is worthy to recall that some schools
without the compulsory preschool program have also been selected in the previous year.
13Roma pupils joining Early Enrollees schools in the pretreatment year - 2008/2009 -
corresponded to 29% of all Roma enrolled in these schools. In Late Enrollees they were
26%. In the first year of the programme - 2009/2010 - these percentages were 29% and
28%. The number of Roma pupils enrolling at school for the first time remained the same
in Early Enrollees schools and increased slightly in Late Enrollees schools. The difference
between the two types of schools is neglibible.
14There was a suggested time allocation. The 30 weekly hours of the assistant could be
distributed in the following way: work at school (19 hours), work with the local community
(8 hours) and writing reports and documentation (3 hours).
15In most cases Roma live in segregated settlements so that assistants can go to the
settlement and visit several families at once.
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providing the necessary knowledge and skills to Roma teaching assistants.16
3.2 Data and trends of the variables
We use primary data collected during five months in the summer/autumn
2010. School data was not available in a digital format and we visited schools
and collected in person data from administrative records. Our dataset con-
tains information on 23 schools (out of 26) among Early Enrollees and 15
schools (out of 77) among Late Enrollees.17 Given that the data collection
process was costly, our dataset consists only of a subsample of Late Enrollees.
We selected 15 Late Enrollees schools according to the following criteria: first,
they had to be in the same district of an Early Enrollees school;18 second,
they had to be in a rural/urban municipality as the nearby Early Enrollees
school; third, they had to share a similar school size to the nearby Early
Enrollees school and finally, a similar percentage of Roma pupils.19
Schools are mainly in Belgrade/Central Serbia and in the South/South-
Eastern part of the country, and they are equally distributed in rural and
urban areas.20 Figure 1 reports the distribution of schools in our sample.
[insert FIGURE 1 here]
The data set contains information on four scholastic years − from 2006/2007
to 2009/2010 − for the lower four grades of primary school for 18,268 Roma
and Non Roma children. It contains for each year and for each pupil the
final mark in mathematics, final mark in Serbian and number of hours of
16In total, the assistants attended 22 working days of seminars and courses in the scholas-
tic year 2009/2010. Regular seminars provided the opportunity to the Ministry to under-
stand the problems of the assistants and guide them through the initial difficulties. In
2010/2011 a set of nine modules, which all assistants had to attend in their first year of
service, was devised.
17In total, there were 26 schools which got an assistant in 2009/2010. In 3 schools we
were not allowed to collect data. These schools do not differ from the other schools either
in the number of pupils or in the percentage of Roma children and they are located in
different areas: one in Belgrade, one in Central Serbia and one in the South.
18A district is made up by more municipalities. In Serbia there are 24 districts and 160
municipalities.
19In few cases the school chosen was not available and we needed to select the second
option.
2010 schools are located in Belgrade; eight schools in the central area of the country (five
schools in the municipality of Valjevo and three in the municipality of Novi Sad); 12 schools
in South-Eastern Serbia (three schools in the municipality of Jagodina, two in Kragujevac,
three in Krusˇevac, three in Zajecˇar and one in Pozˇarevac); eight schools in the South of
the country (six schools in the municipality of Leskovac and two in the municipality of
Niˇs). We define urban area a municipality with more than 35,000 inhabitants.
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absences in a year.21 The data set contains individual characteristics, such
as gender, year of birth, month of birth and place of birth.22 School specific
data include school size, number of Roma - in both school and class - and
whether the school is in an urban setting.
Roma children Table 1 shows summary statistics of the covariates and
main outcomes of interest for Roma children in pre- and treatment years.
[insert TABLE 1 here]
In the pre-treatment year the mean characteristics of the schools that were
enrolled in the program later (column (2), table 1) resemble those of the
schools that enrolled first (column (1), table 1). Boys and girls are equally
distributed in both groups of schools (roughly 50% of students in Early En-
rollees and 47% in Late Enrollees schools are female) and pupils were mainly
born in the same town where they attend school (87% in Early Enrollees and
81% in Late Enrollees schools). Average pupil’s age is 8.7 in both schools.23
A fifth of all students in the schools are Roma. The number of Roma per
class is roughly 4-5 children and the class size is 22.161 in Early Enrollees
and 23.966 in Late Enrollees. The table shows no statistically significant
differences between Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees nor in the students’
and schools’ characteristics nor in the outcomes of interest. This similarity in
covariates between Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees schools is also found
in the treatment year, providing support for our claim that Early Enrollees
and Late Enrollees are comparable.24
By simply comparing average outcomes in the two types of schools, we
see that in the last year dropouts almost double in both types of school
and absences increase in both Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees, but they
increase by less in Early Enrollee schools. We believe that both the in-
crease in dropouts and in absences is related to the liberalization of the visa
regime with the European Union. This regime change induced a consider-
able number of Roma families to migrate to the EU. Finally, we see a minor
21More detailed information regarding the primary education system in Serbia is pro-
vided in section A.1 in the Appendix.
22Roma in Serbia are mainly sedentary: they do not move much within the country.
Nonetheless, there is a substantial out-migration, especially towards the European Union,
and in the last years in-migration has increased due to the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia. Many
Roma refugees in Serbia come from Kosovo.
23In Serbia, primary school consists of 8 years: children enroll if they are aged at least
6.5 years at the start of the scholastic year in September. In the lower four grades of
primary school students are usually aged 6.5 to 10.5.
24The only statistically significant difference is in the place of birth: there are less
migrant children in treated schools.
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improvement in all marks from pre- to treatment year. This effect is larger
in Early Enrollees than in Late Enrollees.
Non Roma children In our main analysis we focus on Roma children
because they are the students targeted by the program. We do not aim at
quantifying differences in school achievement and attendance between Roma
and Non Roma as a consequence of the program and for all our estimations we
only use the sample of Roma. Data on Non Roma children are used separately
in Section A.4 in the Appendix exclusively to investigate possible spillover
effects. Their characteristics are reported here first to provide additional
evidence of the comparability of Early and Late Enrollees schools in both
pre-treatment and treatment year and second to show substantial differences
in education between Roma and Non Roma.
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the covariates and main outcomes of
interest for Non Roma children in both years.
[insert TABLE 2 here]
No statistically significant differences are found neither in the pre- nor in the
treatment year in the pupils’ characteristics, providing further support for
our claim that Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees are comparable. Moreover,
there are no statistically significant differences in the outcomes, excepting
the dropout rate, which is close to zero and not problematic in the lower
primary school grades. Overall, average outcomes suggest that there are no
statistically significant changes for Non Roma children due to the program.
Comparison of Roma and Non Roma children Tables 1 and 2 to-
gether show that the differences in dropouts, absences and marks between
Roma and Non Roma children are striking. Three important aspects need
to be stressed when comparing them. First, dropouts are almost exclusively
of Roma children. Moreover, Roma children are absent from school approx-
imately three to four times more than Non Roma children. Lastly, on a
grading scale of 1 to 5, the difference of almost two marks between Roma
and Non Roma pupils in Serbian and mathematics is substantial. These dif-
ferences apply to both genders. However, when we look more deeply into the
data we observe that among Roma, although girls perform better at school
than boys25 (and differences by gender are statistically significant), their
25There is vast evidence on gender gaps in education and their underlying causes. Buch-
mann et al. (2008) give a very good review of the literature.
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dropouts and absences are higher.26 There are indeed additional aspects we
need to take into account and that explain why in our analysis we also in-
vestigate whether the impact of the intervention differs by gender. First, an
extensive literature suggests that ethnicity exacerbates gender-biased divi-
sions (and vice versa) and that intersection of gender and ethnicity is associ-
ated with systematic outcome disparities across groups, especially in human
capital, with consequences in the long-term (Tas¸ et al., 2014). Second, fe-
male Roma have, on average, a lower educational level, spend fewer years in
school and are more likely to drop out from school than their male counter-
parts (Cukrowska and Kocze, 2013). Among Roma, traditional gender roles
are clearly defined: girls marry at a young age and are expected to take care
of children and home. They more frequently stay out of the labor market or
work in informal employment (Cukrowska and Kocze, 2013). The benefits
of investing in education in the case of girls are perceived as low. Different
impacts by gender of an educational program can be expected.27
4 Econometric strategy
We want to examine the impact of the Roma Teaching Assistant Program
in the first year of its implementation on dropouts, attendance and marks of
Roma pupils. In the following analysis we therefore use only data on Roma
children. We exploit the gradual implementation of the program. Our treat-
ment group consists of schools which started to implement the program in
September 2009 (Early Enrollees), whereas the control group is a subsam-
ple of schools which got the assistants starting from November 2010 (Late
Enrollees). We argue that the selection of schools to enter the program
earlier/later can be treated “as if random” for several reasons. First, the
selection criteria remained almost the same in both rounds.28 Second, one
could argue that schools applying in the first round were more motivated, but
schools which applied in the first year could also apply in the second year.
26In the pre-treatment year, by combining both types of school together, we observe
that girls’ dropouts are 0.01 - versus 0.006 of boys - and their absences correspond to 122
hours - versus 119 of boys. Differences by gender are here not statistically significant.
27In India, where early marriage is also a common phenomenon, Maertens (2013) shows
that perceptions of the ideal age of marriage significantly constrains the education that
parents aspire to have for their daughters. Moreover, such aspirations are not sensitive to
the perceived returns to higher education. That is not the case for boys.
28In both rounds the program was advertised in newspapers Politika and Prosvetni Pre-
gled, the last being a newspaper for people working in the education sector; in addition to
the advertisement, in 2010/2011 schools’ directorates - one directorate may be responsible
for more than a municipality - informed schools directly.
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However, some schools which applied in 2009 did not apply anymore in the
year after.29 Thus, if they really were more motivated and of better quality,
it is hard to understand why they did not want to be part of the program
anymore in 2010. Third, we do know that observable characteristics do not
differ between schools applying in the first year and schools applying in the
second year.30 Fourth, we are in possession of data for three years prior to the
introduction of the program and the placebo tests for these years support our
claim of no systematic differences between the two groups of schools. Fifth,
we do know that the committee for schools selection - composed of the Minis-
ter of Education and other representatives of the Ministry, representatives of
National Council, OSCE and of the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights
- rated schools based on their shown interest and motivation (application) in
the same way, in both years.31
A second possible estimation strategy is to exploit the fact that older
cohorts were less exposed to the program (control group) to younger cohorts
(treated group) in Early Enrollees-treated schools.32
The main advantage of using as a control group schools which enrolled
later in the program is that its impact would not be confounded with other
government policies that took place in the year of its introduction. For
instance, in 2009/2010 all first grade pupils got free text books and in the last
few years the Ministry strongly suggests to schools to reduce repetition rates
especially in the lower grades. The weakness of this control group lies in the
fact that we cannot be completely certain that unobservable characteristics
are the same in Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees schools. In order to
purge time-invariant school characteristics, we can use older cohorts in the
treatment schools as a control group. Nonetheless, this econometric strategy
relies on the strong assumptions that there were no government interventions
over the period - which is not exactly our case - and that the outcomes have
a regular trend over the years. By combining the Early - Late Enrollees
2947% of schools which applied in 2009, and did not get selected, did it again in 2010
and two thirds of them got selected in the second year (16 out of 26 schools applying in
both years). Among these schools, only two schools, corresponding to 12.5%, is present in
our subsample.
30Schools which applied in 2010 are in the same areas of schools of 2009 and they have
almost the same percentage of Roma, on average 13.99% compared to 13.07%. They are
not statistically different (p-value=0.458). These are the only information we have on
schools which applied and did not get selected. These percentages are different from those
reported in table 1 because in table 1 we only refer to the first four grades of primary
school. Here we have percentages corresponding to all eight grades of primary schools.
31In both rounds the committee gave priority to schools in the poorest municipalities or
with huge Roma settlements (Subotica, Novi Sad, Niˇs, Kragujevac, Belgrade).
32This method is similar in spirit to Duflo (2004).
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analysis with the cohort specification we better take into account strengths
and weaknesses of both approaches.
4.1 First Approach: Comparison of Early Enrollees
vs. Late Enrollees
Our first econometric strategy exploits the fact that some schools received the
assistants prior to other schools. We compare Early Enrollees schools with
Late Enrollees schools in the years 2008/2009 - year before the introduction
of the program - and 2009/2010 - year of the introduction of the program.
4.1.1 Average treatment approach
Our specification (1) is a difference-in-difference model with school fixed ef-
fects:
Yijt = β0 + δt + ρj + β1treatmentj ∗ postt + β2X ′ijt + εijt (1)
The outcome variables Yijt are dropout, hours of absences in a year and
final marks in Serbian and mathematics of child i, in school j at time t. δt is a
time fixed effect, ρj corresponds to school fixed effects, and treatmentj ∗postt
is the interaction term between the dummies for treatment status of the
school and treatment year. Dropout is a dummy variable taking value one if
child i dropped out of school during year t, otherwise it is equal to zero. With
school fixed effects we are able to control for time-invariant unobservable
school characteristics as well as unobservable geographical characteristics.
The control variables X ′ijt are school size, school size squared, number of
Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per
class, class size, class size squared, the gender of the child (=1 if the child
is female), age, age squared, and whether the child is a migrant (=1 if the
child was born in the same town where she attends school). The coefficient of
interest (β1) is the difference-in-difference estimator of the interaction term
between treatment and time that captures the difference in outcomes between
the treatment and control schools.
Results for the different outcomes of interest are reported in table 3. For
all outcomes we estimate the regressions without and with controls (columns
(1) and (2)). We then split our sample by gender (columns (3) and (4)) to
assess whether the impact of the intervention differs by gender.33
[insert TABLE 3 here]
33We also control for the gender of the assistant, but it does not turn out to be significant
in any specification.
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Overall, results show that the program had a statistically significant impact
only on hours of absences: pupils exposed to the program were on average al-
most 17 hours less absent from school in a year (0.121 standard deviations).34
This is especially the case for male, whose reduction in absences is of roughly
26 hours (5 days) or equivalently 0.176 standard deviations. Dropouts and
marks in both subjects are unaffected by the program. At first it could seem
surprising that dropouts do not respond to the program, but our preliminary
data analysis has shown that dropouts are not problematic in the lower four
grades. The fact that the inclusion of control variables does not change the
magnitude of our coefficients suggests that our coefficients are very robustly
estimated.
There are only three settlements where children from both control and
treatment schools live together and it is possible that in these settlements
children in Early Enrollees and children in Late Enrollees schools interact.
If one were to believe that there were spillover effects from treated children
on children from control schools, this would imply that coefficients in our
regressions are underestimated.
Placebo regressions The difference-in-difference approach relies on the
parallel trends assumption. We assume that, in the absence of the program,
treatment and comparison schools would have had a parallel trend in the
average outcomes of interest. An obvious way to examine the robustness of
our results is to estimate the same regressions (specification (1)) for the years
2006/2007 versus 2007/2008 and for the years 2007/2008 versus 2008/2009.
By estimating the same regressions for pretreatment years, we can test if the
outcomes in the two groups of schools were regular before the introduction
of the program. Significant difference-in-difference coefficients in placebo
regressions would invalidate our estimation strategy and would question the
adequacy of our comparison group.
Placebo tests are summarized in table 4 and we do not find statistically
significant coefficients.
[insert TABLE 4 here]
The difference-in-difference estimates for Serbian and mathematics are in-
significant and negative for the period immediately preceding the introduc-
tion of the program (2007/2008 versus 2008/2009). Even if one were to
believe that there was a trend prior to the program, then our estimates for
all outcomes are underestimating the effect of the program in the average
34On average, Roma pupils are absent from school 143 hours (28 days) in a year.
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treatment approach.35 The placebo regressions support our claim that Late
Enrollees are a good counterfactual for Early Enrollees.
4.1.2 Intensity of treatment approach
The design of the intervention permits us to investigate whether the effect
of the program varies with the number of Roma per school. Each school
has only one assistant: the higher the number of Roma per school, the less
intense is the program. If the assistant has to help a high number of students,
she will help less each of them: she will be less present both in regular classes
and in activities regarding their homework and assignments.
Our intensity specification is a variation of the previous approach; it still
uses within school variation of Roma, but now we exploit also the variation in
the number of Roma between schools. We divide schools in two equally sized
groups with 19 schools.36 The dummy intensive is equal to one for schools
with fewer than 43 Roma.37 The main difference to the prior model is that
we interact the dummy intensive with treatment and time. We believe that
differentiating the schools in groups helps to better understand the role of the
number of Roma on the impact of the program. The coefficient of interest is
now β6.
The intensity of treatment is modeled:
Yijt = β0 + δt + β1treatmentj + β2treatmentj ∗ postt + β3intensive Romajt+
+ β4intensive Romajt ∗ postt + β5intensive Romajt ∗ treatmentj+
+ β6intensive Romajt ∗ treatmentj ∗ postt + εijt (2)
Results with and without controls, and for both genders are reported in
table 5.
[insert TABLE 5 here]
The intensity of the program clearly plays a role in explaining its effects.
The lower is the number of Roma in a school, and similarly the more the
35Remember that we expect the coefficient of treatment*post in our main regression to
be positive for marks (Serbian and mathematics).
36The average school number of Roma between the two years - pre- and treatment year
- is used to define the two groups. The threshold is here 43 pupils in a school. Our balance
tests for the pretreatment year are reported in the Appendix (table 9).
37In A.2 we vary the threshold and we find that the effect of the program is stronger, the
lower the threshold. This is exactly what we would expect. Remember that this approach
delivers the effect of the program on schools for which we define, based on the threshold,
that the program is intensive. A lower threshold means that less Roma are in that school
and for this reason the program is more effective.
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assistant can help them, the higher is the impact on the outcomes of interest.
Absences, for instance, reduce on average by roughly 36 hours or equivalently
0.228 standard deviations in a year in schools with less Roma, compared to
Late Enrollees schools. The fall in absences is driven by a reduction in ab-
sences of boys, almost 60 hours less. The effects disappear in schools with a
higher number of Roma. Marks in both Serbian and mathematics increase
for pupils in Early Enrollees schools with a lower number of Roma, but again
these effects do not result in schools with a higher number of Roma. The
impacts are especially large for girls, for whom being in a school with a lower
number of Roma seems to be more favorable: on average, if exposed to the
program in a school with less Roma, their marks in Serbian and mathemat-
ics increase by 0.499 (0.419 standard deviations) and 0.680 (0.581 standard
deviations). The improvement in test scores is larger in mathematics than
in languages and this different response to interventions by subject has been
found also in other studies (Fryer, 2014). Possible explanations for the dis-
parity in treatment effects by subject area are offered in Fryer (2014). One
theory suggests that language skills development occurs at an earlier age
than the development of higher cognitive skills. Another prominent theory
suggests that language acquisition and reading test scores are influenced by
factors outside of the classroom. This is plausible because language skills are
used more outside of the classroom than mathematics skills.38
Placebo regressions We estimate placebo regressions of estimation (2)
for the years 2006/2007 versus 2007/2008 and for the years 2007/2008 versus
2008/2009. Placebo tests are summarized in table 6.
[insert TABLE 6 here]
The coefficients for school grades are positive, but not significant for the pe-
riod preceding the program (2007/2008 versus 2008/2009). The coefficients
we obtain for the treatment year are much larger than coefficients from our
placebo regressions. For instance, in mathematics (Serbian) we obtain an
increase of 0.417 (0.307) in marks in treatment year, and this number is only
-0.011 (0.113) for the pretreatment placebo regression. Similarly, for absences
the coefficient is negative, but with -7.490 hours much smaller than the co-
efficient -36.390 from the main regression. Again, the placebo regressions
confirm that Late Enrollees are a good counterfactual for Early Enrollees.
38For the corresponding references from the education literature see Fryer (2014).
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4.2 Second approach: Cohort regressions and triple
difference
We know that assistants worked mostly with the first grade39 and in the
second approach we compare kids in the first grade (young cohorts) with
kids in older grades - second, third and fourth - (old cohorts) in the pre-
and treatment year in Early Enrollees-treated schools. Here we assume that
the difference in marks between first graders’ and second, third and fourth
graders’ would have been constant over time, in the absence of the program.
We also implicitly assume the absence of policies targeting specific grades.
With this econometrics strategy, we are able to purge time-invariant school
characteristics. The specification in this section informs us whether the pro-
gram was successful for the children enrolled in the first grade. We first
estimate the following regression for Early Enrollees :
Yijt = β0 + β1youngi + β2postt + β3youngi ∗ postt + εijt (3)
where Yijt are again dropout, hours of absences and final marks in Serbian
and mathematics of child i, in school j and at time t ; youngt is equal to 1
when the child is at the first grade; postt is equal to 1 in the year of the
treatment (2009/2010). The coefficient of interest is now β3 which tells us
how the first graders have performed compared to the older grades.
The same regression (3) is then estimated for Late Enrollees and the triple
difference between treated and control schools and cohorts is captured by γ3
in the following specification:
Yijt = β0 + β1youngi + β2postt + β3youngi ∗ postt + γ1treatmentj ∗ postt +
+γ2youngi ∗ treatmentj + γ3youngi ∗ postt ∗ treatmentj + εijt (4)
Unlike estimation (3), regression (4) does not control for possible unob-
servable differences between schools. By estimating cohort regressions on a
pooled sample of Early and Late Enrollees, we can control for government
policies targeting specific grades.40
The regressions are estimated with controls and we also inspect the im-
pacts by gender. Results are in table 7.
[insert TABLE 7 here]
39We know this fact from informal discussions with assistants. We have also confirmed
this fact with survey data for Belgrade schools (only a subsample of schools) for which we
have collected additional data. In treated schools, the children with whom the assistant
actually worked were, on average, 9.73 years old, whereas children with whom the assistant
did not work, were 10.44 years old (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2014).
40For instance, free schools books for first grade or lower repetition rates in general.
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When comparing first graders with older pupils in only Early Enrollees
schools (column (1)), our coefficients of interest have, with the exception
of absences, the correct sign, but are not statistically significant. We are not
overly concerned that absences increase, because we observe a similar pattern
also in Late Enrollees-control schools (see column (2) in table 7). We believe
that the overall increase in dropouts is a consequence of visa liberalization:
some families have migrated to EU countries.41 Results of the triple interac-
tion for the full sample are reported in column (3) in table 7. Coefficients for
dropouts are statistically significant. Absences decrease for the young cohort,
but they do not reach statistical significance. Pupils exposed to the program
in the first grade get higher marks than first graders in Late Enrollees-control
schools (with respect to their older mates). This effect is partly driven by the
worse outcomes of first grade pupils in Late Enrollees-control schools. On
average, being in a Early Enrollees school increases marks in Serbian and
mathematics by 0.296 and 0.284 standard deviations for first graders.
Placebo regressions We test the robustness of our results by estimat-
ing placebo regressions (regression (3), (4)) for the years 2006/2007 versus
2007/2008 and for the years 2007/2008 versus 2008/2009 (see table 8).
[insert TABLE 8 here]
None of the relevant coefficients is significant. The size of the coefficient for
Serbian for 2007/2008 versus 2008/2009 is insignificant, but not completely
negligible. Absences for the two placebo tests are positive, but we obtain
a reduction in absences for the treatment year. Similarly, the sign of the
coefficient suggests a worsening of marks for Serbian for younger cohorts,
exactly the opposite of what we find for the year of treatment.
5 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we estimate the impact of the Roma Teaching Assistant Pro-
gram in its first year of implementation on schooling outcomes. We use a
difference-in-difference approach by exploiting the gradual introduction of the
program. We argue that the assignment to enter the program earlier/later
can be treated “as if random”. As an additional check, we use a second
econometric strategy. We compare pupils of the first grade from treated
schools with older cohorts from the same schools. This econometric strategy
controls well for school specific characteristics, but we are not able to control
41Dropouts are included in our regressions and have a high number of hours of absences.
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for government interventions over the observed period. We can combine the
two approaches (Early - Late Enrollees with cohort analysis) and estimate
the triple difference between young and old cohorts in treated and control
schools.
Results of our analysis show that the program had on average a positive
effect. There is evidence that absences fell by 0.121 standard deviations in
treated schools (17 hours, i.e. three to four days). The remedial education
part of the program targeted mainly first graders. Our analysis suggests that,
for this group, marks have improved by almost 0.296 standard deviations in
Serbian and 0.284 standard deviations in mathematics. For the lower primary
school grades, dropouts are low in both Early and Late Enrollees and are
not a major problem. Higher impacts are obtained in schools with a lower
number of Roma: the higher is their number, the less the assistant can help
them, and the lower is the impact of the program on the outcomes of interest.
In schools with fewer Roma, girls seem to benefit more from the program in
terms of better marks, whereas boys exhibit lower absences. With our data it
is not possible to explain this differential impact of the program. We do not
know if assistants worked more with girls (boys) or if girls (boys) responded
better to the program in the case of marks (absences).
While first graders in treated schools perform better than their older col-
leagues, overall the program does not seem to have a significant impact on
pupils’ achievement. This is likely the case because assistants work mainly
with lower grades and young cohorts are those really exposed to them. There-
fore, the general modest effects should not be interpreted as a failure of the
program. Moreover, this study looks only at its impact in the first year. It
is possible that assistants and schools need some time to adjust to the new
role of the assistant and that the full benefit from them will come at a later
stage. This idea is also supported by the literature on the importance of
the experience of teachers which emphasizes that gains in teaching skills are
largest in the initial years of teaching (Rivkin et al., 2005). Still, our results
suggest that the program is more effective in schools with less Roma. We are
aware that it is possible that there are systematic differences between schools
with a lower and a higher share of Roma. One could argue, for instance, that
Roma in schools with a lower share are more willing to adapt and assimilate
to the majority population. We cannot be certain that the same effects could
be attained in schools with higher percentage of Roma if more assistants were
assigned to these schools. It still seems plausible that if the goal of the policy
maker is to close the gap in schooling outcomes, then more Roma teaching
assistants should be assigned to schools with more Roma students.
We are not able to delve into the mechanism which drives our results and
our estimates are derived from reduced form regressions. Still, our results
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could and probably are driven by two main mechanisms. First, the RTA in-
tervention alters the inputs of the education production function. Moreover,
negative stereotypes about Roma students are softened and teachers could
provide more support in learning. The input of teaching is augmented and
this can explain better marks of first grade students. A second mechanism
possibly at play is the cultural transmission of preferences for education. The
presence of a person coming from the same Roma ethnic background could
alter the preferences for education and beliefs of Roma pupils, which induces
them to attend more school and to exert more effort at school.
In the context of the literature on schooling of Roma communities, our
study makes two important contributions. First, to our knowledge there are
no rigorous evaluations of other educational interventions targeting Roma
children and our study is the first step in this direction. Ideally, the policy
maker would like to know about a range of possible policies and their exact
effects and costs. Our study provides clear evidence about the effects of
the RTA Program on a range of outcomes. Second, a key part of the RTA
Program is the role model component, that is the teaching assistants have
the same background as the treated children. The success of this program is
likely to be related to this fact because the assistants know well the Roma
culture and are accepted by the Roma community. Thus, our study suggests
that programs targeting Roma should take into account their culture and
specificity and ensure that the program gets accepted by the community.
This paper has laid the foundations for understanding better the RTA
Program, but some limitations of the study exist and need to be pointed out.
The country we study is a post-communist country and we believe that our
findings are suggestive and applicable also to other Eastern European coun-
tries which share a similar political history with Serbia, but not necessarily
to all other countries. During communism the Eastern European countries
have implemented inclusive policies towards Roma and in this period the sit-
uation of Roma improved despite the fact that they remained at the bottom
of all socio-economic indicators (Barany, 2000). In these countries Roma
are predominantly sedentary and their assimilation process, especially with
respect to education, has started a while ago.
In this paper we look only at the short-term effects. The impacts we
observe are suggestive of positive potential implications for households and
schools. Kids are going more to school and this, in the long-run, can lead to
persistent effects in the labor market and improvement in Roma well-being
and social inclusion. Moreover, negative stereotypes about Roma students
can be softened and this in turn can affect positively both the school en-
vironment and school quality. The medium- and long-run effects would be
more informative on the real success of the program. Future research in this
22
direction is highly advised in order to understand fully the effectiveness of
the program.
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Table 1: Roma - Means of covariates and outcomes in pre-treatment and
treatment years
Pre-treatment year Treatment year
Early Late Early Late
Enrollees Enrollees Difference Enrollees Enrollees Difference
(1) (2) (3)[(1)-(2)] (4) (5) (6)[(4)-(5)]
Characteristics
Female 0.502 0.471 0.031 0.486 0.469 0.017
(0.023) (0.026)
Age 8.748 8.675 0.073 8.677 8.742 -0.065
(0.089) (0.110)
Born in the same town 0.867 0.814 0.053 0.877 0.807 0.070*
(0.038) (0.035)
Roma per school 0.223 0.193 0.030 0.235 0.194 0.041
(0.056) (0.057)
School size 304.937 361.506 -56.569 301.217 362.581 -61.364
(52.963) (56.046)
% of Roma per class 0.221 0.183 0.038 0.234 0.185 0.049
(0.056) (0.057)
Class size 22.161 23.966 -1.804 22.438 24.213 -1.775
(1.424) (1.381)
Outcomes
Dropouta 0.015 0.019 -0.004 0.026 0.035 -0.009
(0.006) (0.009)
Absences (hours) 118.103 125.378 -7.275 134.037 155.528 -21.491
(13.722) (16.808)
Serbianb 2.430 2.547 -0.117 2.496 2.568 -0.072
(0.123) (0.144)
Mathematicsb 2.284 2.370 -0.086 2.365 2.408 -0.043
(0.125) (0.156)
Number of schools 23 15 23 15
Number of Roma pupils 1241 811 1268 847
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
29
Table 2: Non Roma - Means of covariates and outcomes in pre-treatment
and treatment years
Pre-treatment year Treatment year
Early Late Early Late
Enrollees Enrollees Difference Enrollees Enrollees Difference
(1) (2) (3)[(1)-(2)] (4) (5) (6)[(4)-(5)]
Characteristics
Female 0.487 0.477 0.010 0.469 0.486 -0.017
(0.014) (0.012)
Age 8.421 8.400 0.021 8.426 8.416 0.009
(0.066) (0.033)
Born in the same town 0.922 0.912 0.010 0.930 0.923 0.007
(0.011) (0.011)
Roma per school 0.223 0.193 0.030 0.235 0.194 0.041
(0.056) (0.057)
School size 304.937 361.506 -56.569 301.217 362.581 -61.364
(52.963) (56.046)
% of Roma per class 0.221 0.183 0.038 0.234 0.185 0.049
(0.056) (0.057)
Class size 22.161 23.966 -1.804 22.438 24.213 -1.775
(1.424) (1.381)
Outcomes
Dropouta 0.001 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 0.000 0.001**
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Absences (hours) 39.159 36.231 2.938 42.549 40.276 2.273
(2.535) (2.743)
Serbianb 4.396 4.328 0.068 4.434 4.339 0.094
(0.070) (0.072)
Mathematicsb 4.255 4.179 0.076 4.296 4.208 0.088
(0.080) (0.081)
Number of schools 23 15 23 15
Number of Non Roma pupils 4303 3374 4122 3514
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
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Table 3: Average treatment approach
Effect of program in treatment year
all all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dropouta
post 0.017** 0.015** 0.001 0.027**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
treatment*post -0.006 0.003 0.028* -0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
No. observations 4167 4039 1951 2088
Absences
post 31.236*** 32.853*** 22.456*** 42.034***
(7.856) (9.078) (10.797) (10.764)
treatment*post -17.299** -16.679* -4.713 -26.119**
(7.856) (9.078) (10.797) (10.764)
No. observations 3980 3868 1871 1997
Serbianb
post 0.039 0.046 0.079 0.027
(0.060) (0.048) (0.055) (0.050)
treatment*post 0.044 0.012 -0.035 0.058
(0.069) (0.066) (0.075) (0.080)
Mathematicsb
post 0.051 0.065 0.096 0.041
(0.069) (0.062) (0.080) (0.056)
treatment*post 0.046 0.030 0.015 0.053
(0.081) (0.077) (0.091) (0.085)
No. observations 4085 3961 1916 2045
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effect of the program on dropouts, absences and
Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; oth-
erwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in
school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, and migrant
(=1).
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Table 4: Average treatment approach - Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006/2007 and 2007/2008 2007/2008 and 2008/2009
all female male all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
treatment*post -0.003 0.006 -0.010 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014)
No. observations 3640 1776 1864 3897 1897 2000
Absences
treatment*post 0.955 -2.002 3.566 9.558 2.921 14.935
(12.592) (17.435) (14.753) (13.864) (19.448) (10.602)
No. observations 3542 1732 1810 3788 1850 1938
Serbianb
treatment*post 0.059 0.141 -0.025 -0.094 -0.103 -0.053
(0.080) (0.105) (0.103) (0.077) (0.093) (0.072)
Mathematicsb
treatment*post 0.080 0.093 0.067 -0.057 -0.102 0.007
(0.066) (0.075) (0.080) (0.077) (0.098) (0.080)
No. observations 3585 1750 1835 3846 1876 1970
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for the aver-
age treatment approach. The outcomes of the regressions are dropouts, absences, Serbian
and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are
reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of
Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female
(=1), age, age squared, and migrant (=1).
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Table 5: Intensity of treatment
Effect of program in treatment year
all all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dropouta
treatment*post -0.007 -0.001 0.009 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
intensive*treatment*post 0.008 0.001 0.044 -0.038
(0.025) (0.023) (0.044) (0.035)
No. observations 4167 4039 1951 2088
Absences
treatment*post -8.707 -4.089 1.886 -9.058
(7.720) (8.394) (8.324) (11.931)
intensive*treatment*post -19.312 -36.390 -9.522 -59.759**
( 27.119) (24.179) (36.096) (24.684)
No. observations 3980 3868 1871 1997
Serbianb
treatment*post -0.027 -0.058 -0.154* 0.041
(0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.094)
intensive*treatment*post 0.330* 0.307** 0.499** 0.108
(0.169) (0.150) (0.186) (0.151)
Mathematicsb
treatment*post -0.053 -0.078 -0.169 0.012
(0.081) (0.080) (0.093) (0.088)
intensive*treatment*post 0.454** 0.417** 0.680*** 0.161
(0.152) (0.143) (0.179) (0.138)
No. observations 4085 3961 1916 2045
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effect of the program on dropouts, absences and Serbian
and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school
level are reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, percentage of Roma per
class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant (=1),
and intensive (=1). Intensive is equal to 1 for schools with fewer than 43 Roma.
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Table 6: Intensity of treatment - Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006/2007 and 2007/2008 2007/2008 and 2008/2009
all female male all female male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
intensive*treatment*post 0.010 0.056 -0.037 -0.014 -0.072 0.042
(0.016) (0.050) (0.039) (0.019) (0.040) (0.035)
No. observations 3640 1776 1864 3897 1897 2000
Absences
intensive*treatment*post 39.511 89.215 -11.344 -7.490 -40.031 25.702
(42.393) (60.105) (34.917) (26.991) (34.883) (25.084)
No. observations 3542 1732 1810 3788 1850 1938
Serbianb
intensive*treatment*post 0.002 -0.145 0.164 0.113 -0.039 0.240
(0.148) (0.190) (0.184) (0.163) (0.187) (0.207)
Mathematicsb
intensive*treatment*post 0.026 -0.150 0.199 -0.011 -0.135 0.100
(0.169) (0.208) (0.205) (0.133) (0.189) (0.159)
No. observations 3585 1750 1835 3846 1876 1970
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for the intensity of
treatment approach. The outcomes of the regressions are dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics.
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma
in school squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age
squared, migrant (=1), and intensive (=1). Intensive is equal to 1 for schools with fewer than 43 Roma.
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Table 8: Cohort regression - Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006/2007 and 2007/2008 2007/2008 and 2008/2009
Early Late All Early Late All
Enrollees Enrollees Enrollees Enrollees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
young*post 0.003 0.008 0.011 -0.020 -0.036** -0.037***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
young*post*treatment -0.010 0.019
(0.024) (0.020)
No. observations 2259 1381 3640 2389 1508 3897
Absences
young*post -14.021 -56.385* -54.237* -9.425 -13.207 -13.596
(17.068) (27.822) (28.643) (13.600) (16.765) (18.055)
young*post*treatment 34.591 10.100
(32.454) (23.240)
No. observations 2203 1339 3542 2331 1457 3788
Serbianb
young*post 0.030 0.143 0.105 -0.167 0.034 0.043
(0.207) (0.194) (0.203) (0.178) (0.154) (0.156)
young*post*treatment -0.024 -0.244
(0.278) (0.231)
Mathematicsb
young*post 0.164 0.117 0.086 -0.101 -0.115 -0.113
(0.237) (0.180) (0.185) (0.145) (0.197) (0.196)
young*post*treatment 0.122 -0.022
(0.286) (0.239)
No. observations 2232 1354 3586 2364 1482 3846
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for cohort comparison
methodology. The outcomes of the regressions are dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust
standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Dropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
b Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in
school squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared,
migrant (=1) and young (=1). Young is equal to 1 when the child is at the first grade.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Location of the schools with assistants
This figure reports the distribution of schools in our sample. In pink munic-
ipalities there are only Early Enrollee school; in green municipalities there
are only Late Enrollee school and in dark blue municipalities there are both
Early and Late Enrollee schools.
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A Appendix
A.1 Primary Education System in Serbia
In Serbia, school is compulsory until age 15. Children enroll at primary
school if they are aged at least 6.5 years at the start of the scholastic year
in September. Since 2007 the attendance of at least 6 months of a cost-
free preschool program is compulsory; in 2010 the length of the compulsory
preschool has been extended to 9 months.42
Primary school consists of 8 years. In the first four grades pupils get one
teacher who teaches all compulsory subjects except English, while in the up-
per four years pupils have one teacher per subject. In the first grade teachers
use descriptive marks; from the second grade on, the range of marks is 1 to
5 with 1 being the insufficient and worst mark. The marks are categorical.
During each semester, a child gets four marks for each subject. Out of the
four marks, at least two marks are derived from written tests. The teacher
can decide what to use as assessment for the remaining two marks. She
could give additional written tests, give marks based on oral examination,
homework or class participation (students’ motivation and effort are taken
into account by the teacher). The final mark at the end of the year is the
arithmetic mean of eight marks. If a pupil gets at least one insufficient mark
at the end of the year, her teacher can decide whether to let her pass to the
upper grade or to ask her to take the retake exam in August. In the last few
years the Ministry of Education has suggested that schools reduce repetition
rates, especially in the lower four grades.
There are no school fees for primary school, but indirect costs such as
books and other school material can pose a considerable cost for some par-
ents.43 The Ministry of Education aims at reducing the cost of education
and the first graders in 2009/2010 are the first generation to receive free text
books. The plan is that this generation and all younger generations obtain
free school books in the future.
42The obligatory preschool program has been introduced in order to facilitate the tran-
sition to school for children from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In the initial years
the capacities of preschool institutions were not sufficient to enroll all preschool children.
Hence, some children, mainly from poorer families or in rural areas, could not be enrolled
in preschool. However, due to the lack in the enforcement of the law, they were allowed
to enroll in school also without having attended the compulsory preschool program.
43On average, in Serbia costs associated with school (books and other school material)
correspond to almost 2% of yearly household income (LSMS 2003). Based on a survey
we conducted in Belgrade, for Roma people these costs account for 6% of their yearly
household income.
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A.2 Sensitivity analysis of the threshold of intensity of
treatment
In the main body of this paper, we examine how the effect of the program
varies based on the number of Roma in a school. We split the schools in two
equally sized groups based on the number of Roma in the school. We define a
dummy ‘intensive’ which takes value 1 if a school is among schools with less
Roma (at most 43 Roma children), and value 0 if a school is among schools
with more Roma (more than 43 Roma children). Our balance tests for the
pretreatment year are reported in table 9.
[insert TABLE 9 here]
In this section we report how our results change when we vary this threshold.
Table 10 shows the results of the intensity of treatment approach for different
thresholds.
[insert TABLE 10 here]
We rank the schools based on the number of Roma, starting with the lowest,
and divide then the schools in 10 deciles. Column (1) of the table reports
the results if we set the dummy ‘intensive’ equal to 1 for schools in the first
decile and 0 otherwise. In column (2) we set the dummy ‘intensive’ equal to 1
for schools in the first and second decile, and 0 otherwise, etc. The reported
coefficient (intensive*treatment*post) captures the effect of the program on
treated children in schools where the program is ‘intensive’. Essentially, going
from the left to the right columns we increase the number of schools and thus
the number children for which we consider the program to be ‘intensive’.
For instance, in column (1) children in schools with less than 16 Roma are
considered to be treated. In column (2) this number rises to 23 Roma per
school, etc. We expect that the effect of the program drops as we go from left
to the right columns and this is exactly what this table shows. The results in
table 10 are only indicative and should be interpreted with caution especially
for the lower deciles. For lower deciles we consider only very few schools to
be actually treated (in the case of column (1) only one treated school falls
into the first decile).
A.3 Cost of the program
This section aims to give an estimate of the cost of the program and to con-
trast this program to alternative interventions available to the government.
At this early stage of the program it is not possible to provide an estimate of
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the monetary benefits. Still, we discuss two possible channels through which
this program could affect future labor market outcomes and thus, could have
a monetary gain. First, the program could raise completion rates of primary
school and consequently, the average educational attainment of treated Roma
children. Higher educational attainment implies higher earnings (Angrist and
Krueger, 1991). We do not find that dropout rates fall overall, because in the
lower 4 grades of primary school the dropout rates are already low. Primary
school lasts 8 years and we believe that dropout rates in the higher grade
(from 5th to 8th) are the ones actually affected by the program. A second
channel through which the program could affect children’s labor market out-
comes is through better marks. Several studies (Murnane et al., 1995; Neal
and Johnson, 1996; Currie and Thomas, 1999) have demonstrated a posi-
tive relationship between pupils’ attainments at school and their subsequent
earnings.
The main cost of the program are the (gross) wages of the assistants which
amount to 450 Euros per month. In addition to that, in 2009/2010, assistants
attended 7 trainings totaling up to 22 days. Our estimation suggests that
the training per assistant had a cost of approximately 1,200 Euros.44 The
turnover of the assistants in the first year was very low with only two people
quitting in that period. This is especially important because it indicates
that training costs will not be bore each year. Not taking into account
the training costs, we calculate that the program cost 100 Euros per Roma
student per year.45 We know that in Belgrade 53% of Roma children were
actually treated (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2014), assuming that the take up
rate was the same also in the whole of Serbia, this yields a cost of 200 Euros
per treated child.
There are no cost estimates of other programs in Serbia to which this
program could be directly compared. We still discuss two other measures
which we consider alternatives to the RTA Program. One possible alternative
would be to use professional teachers to give remedial education classes. The
gross wage of teachers is in the range of 900 to 1,200 Euros depending on the
experience and thus twice the amount paid to the assistants. Assuming that
44We calculate the cost for accommodation and stay during the training to be 40 Euros
per day plus transport costs of 10 Euros for 7 travels. This amounts to 950 Euros. There
were 22 days of training and we add additional 14 days for preparation of training and
reporting. The cost of trainers is 150 Euros per day and the wage cost is 5,400 Euros.
Accommodation, stay and travel costs of trainers are 1,510 Euros (22 days*40 Euros +
7 travels *10 Euros). Therefore, the total costs for trainers including their stay and
accommodation is 6,910. Dividing this sum with 26 (number of assistants) gives 265
Euros per assistant. The cost of accommodation per assistant (950 Euros) plus training
per assistant (265 Euros) adds up to a total cost of the training of 1,215 Euros.
45450 Euros *12 month [wages]* 23 schools /1268 Roma students = 97,95 Euros.
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two assistants have at least the same performance as one teacher, the RTA
Program is more cost effective. Aside from being less costly, an additional
advantage of the Roma Teaching Assistants is that they act as role models
for Roma children and this cannot be easily quantified in monetary terms. A
second option available to the policy maker would be class size reduction, but
this intervention did not yield satisfactory results in some settings (Hoxby,
2000) and is a very costly intervention. Another disadvantage of the class
size reduction is that it does not specifically target disadvantaged children.
All of these facts, taken together, indicate that the program is with 200
Euros per child per year not overly costly and that it also performs well with
respect to its alternatives.
A.4 Spillover effects - Non Roma pupils
We can investigate whether this program also affects Non Roma pupils. We
employ both econometric strategies and their combination and find that nei-
ther absences reduced nor marks improved for Non Roma students. The
presence of a Roma assistant does not improve Non Roma schooling out-
comes. Results are reported in tables 11 and 12.
[insert TABLES 11 and 12 here]
These results, combined together with the previous ones, provide some
evidence that the program is succeeding in reducing the gap between Roma
and Non Roma children, both in school achievements and attendance.
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Table 11: Average treatment approach - Non Roma
Effect of program in treatment year
on Non Roma
Absences Serbiana Mathematicsa
(1) (2) (3)
post 5.025*** -0.011 0.011
(1.185) (0.031) (0.018)
treatment*post -1.586 0.054 0.029
(1.725) (0.034) (0.025)
No. observations 14686 14982 14981
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effect of the program on Non Roma for
absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors
corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in paren-
theses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
a Marks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
b Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of
Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage
of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1),
age, age squared, and migrant (=1).
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